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Given the controversy around the effect of income inequality on economic growth, we
analyze if government intervention towards its reduction is desirable. Moreover, we
test if human capital is a major vehicle through which redistribution operates. Using
data on 174 countries, from 1960 to 2008, we verify that those who redistribute more
present higher levels of 10-year growth more frequently. We also find that redistribu-
tion has a statistically significant positive effect on growth, and this impact is higher
in developing economies. We did not find evidence that human capital captures this
positive impact, which supports that other vehicles are responsible for this effect.
Keywords: Inequality, Redistribution, Human Capital, Growth
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1 Introduction
The impact of inequality on economic growth is still a controversial topic among economists.
Even for those who found that it can jeopardize growth, it is not immediate that policymakers
should intervene to reduce it, as the effect of that intervention can also harm growth, by
creating market distortions which generate a dead-weight loss.
One of the vehicles through which inequality might harm growth is by depriving individ-
uals from investing in human capital. We aim to study how does government intervention
to reduce inequality affects growth, and also up to which extent is that effect captured by
the human capital vehicle. Human Capital was described by Adam Smith as something that
not only allowed enterprises to become more efficient and profitable, it adds to the collective
wealth of society. Investing in human capital usually requires a threshold of wealth which
might not be affordable for every individual within a given economy. One of the most com-
mon methods used to measure human capital is through schooling, since it allows individuals
to obtain knowledge which as Adam Smith said, can be further used for their own benefit
(by increasing the productivity of their work) as well as helping individuals to become better
citizens which benefits the whole society. But schooling has a cost, which not all families can
afford, and when the wealth distribution within the society is too unequal, a large number
of families might face financial struggle would they send their children to school, and as con-
sequence, opt for not doing so. That can lead to a sub-optimal level of investment in human
capital, and thus comprise the potential output of the economy. It is under this theoretical
framework that we test the hypothesis that government intervention that reduces inequality




The first economists who focused on inequality issues were Lewis (1954) and Kaldor (1955),
who stated that a higher level of inequality would have a positive impact on economic
growth. Under the assumption that the marginal propensity to save of individuals increases
with their wealth level, inequality that favors high saving capitalists, would allow for higher
capital accumulation, and thus generate growth. Lazear and Rosen (1979) supported the
same conclusion, justifying that inequality could provide incentives for entrepreneurship and
innovation.
However, the theoretical models changed, and inequality became widely accepted as
affecting growth negatively, even though, not always directly. The first vehicle through
which inequality can harm growth is due to redistribution policies. Okun (1977) argued
that unequal countries spend more resources in redistribution. Perotti (1996), develops the
hypothesis raised by Okun, as he found empirical evidence that inequality increases the
pressure for redistribution policies, which have a marginal cost for society. Saint-Paul and
Verdier (1993) claimed that providing health and education spending for the poor can help
offsetting both labor and capital market imperfections, since the poor have lower bargaining
power, thus leading to inefficiencies.
Galor and Zeira (1993), came up with the idea that inequality can be harmful since
it denies a higher proportion of the population in a given economy the capacity to invest
in human capital, and thus compromises the potential output. This work was a departure
point for many others as it presented a structural disadvantage to having inequality increase.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) suggested that inequality increases fertility, thus increasing the
Malthusian effect of population growth. Aghion et al. (1999) came up with two extra reasons
to explain why inequality can be harmful to growth: first, it worsens borrowers incentives by
increasing the demand for credit, and thus reducing the disposable wealth available for those
who inherit less, which can impede them to invest in human capital. Second, it also increases
macro-economic volatility, since the cost of credit increases, the capacity for individuals
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to borrow in order to smooth wealth cycles declines. Rodrik (1999) complemented the
macroeconomic analysis of the effects of inequality. He suggests that a country with higher
inequality, is more likely to have conflicts within it’s society, which can make the allocation
of resources inefficient when a response to a negative external shock is required: fiscal policy
and the adjustment of relative prices such as wages can be compromised by redistribution,
instead of used to increase productivity.
Barro (2000) put an end to the cycle of pro-equality research, by suggesting that in
very poor countries, some inequality can be beneficial, by allowing a few individuals to have
the minimum threshold to become entrepreneurs, or to pay for education. It is the same
as saying that when the wealth distribution is positioned in such low level, some positive
skewness can trigger growth.
Back to pro-equality, Benabou (2000) has some reserves as to Perotti’s hypothesis that
inequality generates pressure for redistributive policies. He claims that the empirical data
do not support that more unequal countries are the ones who redistribute more. He then
suggests that redistributive policies can increase ex-ante welfare, and the political support
for those is reduced with higher inequality. Easterly (2007) provided us with an atypical
piece of work. He used cross-country data on agricultural endowments to predict inequality,
and then to predict not only growth, as well as other development outcomes such as quality
of institutions and schooling, enhancing the idea that inequality can undermine growth.
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) suggested that less equality can lead to higher financial
leverage of the lower and middle classes, since the high income of the upper class households
is "recycled" to the poor and middle-class via loans, thus increasing the vulnerability to a
crisis. Stiglitz (2012) also contributed to support the idea that inequality hurts growth:
under the idea developed by Kumhof and Ranciere, Stiglitz found evidence that the upper
classes can undermine the political process in their favor, thus increasing inequality, and
thus leveraging the economy, as wealth is moved from those with higher marginal propensity
to consume, to those with less, creating a gap which is filled by that leverage, and thus
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increasing volatility, as more levered economies are expected to be more affected by shocks.
However, Stiglitz suggests that volatility also promotes higher levels of inequality, since the
bargaining power of those at the bottom is lower, they are the ones most affected by negative
shocks. These ideas suggest that inequality is a vicious cycle. Finally, Ostry et al. (2011)
and Berg et al. (2012) tested the hypothesis that inequality can increase the probability of
a break in a growth cycle. They verified, using cross-country data, that growth is easy to
trigger, but hard to keep going, and inequality appears to have a statistically significant
negative effect on the duration of growth spells.
We found that inequality is a controversial issue for those who study economics, either
due to its direct and indirect effect on growth. Three vehicles through which inequality
can harm economic growth were presented: increasing pressure for redistribution policies
which enables to mitigate the inequality problem, can not do so without a cost. However,
Benabou found evidence that more equal countries tend to distribute more, which is the
inverse of what was proposed by Okun. Second, inequality can deprive individuals from
investing in human capital, and finally, it can increase macroeconomic instability. In this
work we propose to analyze the partial impact of redistribution policies on growth. Even
under the assumption that inequality can harm economic growth, it is not clear that the
government should intervene to reduce it, due to the marginal cost of such intervention.
When brought together, the causality relationships between inequality, redistribution, human
capital investment and growth might not be clear to identify. Let us for instance assume
the hypothesis that more unequal countries tend to impede their citizens from investing in
human capital. It then seems that redistribution is the solution for this problem, since it
would provide the lower classes with the income level they needed to pay for education.
However, this redistribution policies usually have a marginal cost of implementation. Hence,
the net effect may not be crystal clear. We will analyze which of the impacts is supreme, or
if they actually cancel out. Furthermore, we test if some of the impact of redistribution is
captured by the human capital vehicle, which would mean that more redistribution allows
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more individuals to invest in human capital
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
In order to measure inequality, we use the data of the Gini index from the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which combines data from the World Income
Inequality Database of the United Nations University, the OECD, the World Bank, the
UN Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the World Top Income
database, the University of Texas Inequality Project, and many other academic studies. The
SWIID provides data on inequality in 174 countries, measured by the Gini Index. It has
the advantage of being previously prepared for comparison purposes, and also provides the
data for the net and gross Gini index. The gross Gini Index measures the level of market
inequality, i.e. resultant from "a free market economy", prior to government intervention.
On the other hand, the net Gini index measures the level of inequality after government
intervention.
Data on educational attainment was selected from the Barro and Lee database, which
contains several indicators considered by the World Bank as accurate to measure the level
of Human Capital. We use data on the proportion of over 15 aged individuals who attended
a minimum level of schooling.
For the data on the per capita GDP and degree of trade openness, we use the available
data from World Bank.
Our dataset contains a total of 174 countries, and ranges from 1960 to 2007, yielding a
total of 3524 observations, from which 1385 are complete.
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2.2 Variables
To study the impact of redistribution policies on economic growth, one needs to take into
account several issues. First, income inequality can be measured prior and post government
intervention. Gross inequality is the level of inequality that results from the free market
activity, prior to government intervention. Net inequality on the other hand, refers to the
level of inequality existent in a given country after government redistribution policies (tax-
ation and subsidies) affect the wealth of individuals. We proxy the redistribution level due
to government action by computing the difference between the gross and net Gini indices,
given by:
Red = Ggross −Gnet
where Red stands for redistribution, Ggross is the gross Gini Index and Gnet is the net Gini
Index. The causality relationship between inequality and growth is not clear. Does inequality
affect growth, or countries which grow faster tend to have different wealth distributions than
those who grow slower? This could undermine any conclusion we derive from our results as
we intend to capture the impact of redistribution on growth, it could be case that we were
capturing the impact of growth on redistribution. Since the future can not affect the past,
we solve this simultaneity problem by studying the behavior of economic growth on 10-year
cycles, based on variables at the beginning of the cycle. In practice, any growth in per capita
GDP on the next ten years can not explain the level of effort the government does today
to correct inequalities, on the other hand, the effort made today might help explaining the




where g10,t stands for 10 year GDP per capita growth, and GDPPCt: Is the GDP per capita
of year t.
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From the Barro and Lee dataset we obtain the geographic regions used as control variables
in our regressions. The regions list includes: East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and the
Sub-Saharan Africa.
In order to control for trade openness we use the proportion of international trade (sum of
exports and imports) over GDP, directly download from the World Bank. We then compute
the proxy for trade openness:
TradeOpenness = Exports+Imports
GDP
Finally, we are left with human capital. There is no general consensus on which variable
is the best proxy for human capital. The World Bank suggests that education is a good
one, but there are many indicators which can be used. Unlike physical capital, human
capital is hardly measured in monetary units, which makes it difficult to quantify. We focus
on the education component of human capital, due to the lack of data available on other
instruments. From the Barro and Lee dataset we obtain the proportion of over 15-aged
individuals who attained a minimum level of schooling, which we denominate as Schooling.
The descriptive statistics of our variables are as follows:
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics
Advanced Sub-developed Full Sample
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Year 1987 1960 2008 1990 1960 2007 1,989 1960 2008
g10 107.52% -100.00% 498.02% 69.88% -71.97% 732.83% 82.70% -100.00% 732.83%
Red 0.15 0.02 0.29 0.06 -0.05 0.23 0.08 -0.05 0.29
Schooling 94.7% 33.94% 99.93% 75.04% 6.33% 99.99% 80.63% 6.33% 99.99%
GDPPCt−10 12938 349 53357 2101 59 31572 5794 59 53358
TradeOpenness 64.50% 8.76% 336.25% 72.27% 5.01% 411.04% 70.11% 5.01% 411.04%
# Complete Obs. 553 852 1,385
2.3 Model & Tests
We use cross country regression analysis on 10-year growth, since we intend to test the
impact of redistribution policies which might take some time to impact. We run a full sample
regression in order to have a general outlook of the relationship between the reduction of
inequality due to government intervention and economic growth, and then we present a
regression for the advanced economies (under the classification found in Barro and Lee) and
for developing economies for robustness purposes.
We use two regression models in our study. To test for the net impact of redistribution on
GDP per capita growth, we regress the variable of growth g10i,t , on our redistribution proxy,
plus the set of control variables previously described.
g10i,t = α + β1Redi,t−10 + X’i,t−10γ
where X’i,t−10 stands for the vector of control variables used and γ the vector of coefficients
for the controls, which include the degree of trade openness, the starting point measured
by the GDP per capita level at the beginning of the 10-year cycle, the different geography
locations found in the Barro and Lee database, and a dummy variable per year to control
for year specific effects.
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Given a set of vehicles through which inequality can harm growth, and a set of vehicles
through which it can support it, our regressions intend to show which one prevails. If we find
that redistribution does have a positive effect on growth, we believe it is interesting to test
if the human capital vehicle captures any of that effect. This would support the hypothesis
raised by Galor and Zeira that inequality might harm growth by jeopardizing human capital
accumulation. If we find that it does not, then it is likely that the remaining vehicles found in
the literature operate as main drivers, or that innovative work on this topic is still required.
g10i,t = α + β1Redi,t−10 + β2Schoolingi,t−10 + X’i,t−10γ
After running the regressions, we intend to test whether or not the distribution of growth
rates of per capita GDP changes with the level of redistribution that occurs due to govern-
ment action. We take the residuals from the regressions without including the variable for
redistribution, and then we separate those residuals in three groups. The first group corre-
sponds to the set of observations that in each year belong to the bottom 33% of countries
who maid a smaller redistribution effort. The second group corresponds to the set of obser-
vations that in each year belong to the group of countries within the bottom 33% and the
top 33% of redistribution effort. Finally, the third group corresponds to the top 33% who
redistribute more in each year. After creating these groups, we test whether or not the distri-
bution of growth (net of general growth factors, by using the residuals from the regressions)
changes between them by running a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for the full sample, and also
for the advanced and developing economies samples. Below we can find the plots with the
distributions of the residual 10-year growth, per quantile of redistribution effort.
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Figure 1 - Distributions of residual 10-year per capita GDP growth conditional on redistribution effort - Full Sample
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Figure 2 - Distributions of residual 10-year per capita GDP growth conditional on redistribution effort - Economies versus
Sub-developed
The previous figures plot the distribution of the per capita GDP growth net of the
effects controlled in the regression and conditional on the redistribution effort made each
year. The blue line represents the empirical distribution of the set of the 33% countries who
redistributed less each year, using Kernel density. The green line captures the set of 33%
who redistributed more, and the red plots the ones in between. In the full sample and in
the sample of the advanced economies (Figure 1 and right hand side of Figure 2) one can
see a movement of the distribution to the right when the level of redistribution effort is
higher, thus supporting that countries which redistribute more can increase the probability
of achieving higher levels of growth. In the sample of developing economies, we do not see
that the same movement, but the positive skewness of the distribution is clearly ascending
with the level of redistribution effort, which also indicates that countries who distribute more
tend to have a higher probability of achieving higher levels of long-run growth in per capita
GDP
We perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the hypothesis that countries who stand
on different quantiles of the redistribution effort have a different distribution of the long-run
GDP per capita growth.
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3 Results
Table 2- Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for the difference between distributions
Low vs. Mid Mid vs. High
Full Sample 0.005 0.000
Advanced Economies 0.925 0.000
Sub-developed Economies 0.915 0.000
The reported values are p-values
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Table 2 presents the p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on the full sam-
ple, the sample of advanced economies and the sample of developing economies. We test
if the distribution of the long-run run per capita GDP growth changes with the level of
redistribution effort made per country in each year. The results found in the full sample
indicate a positive difference between all categories supporting that more redistribution in-
creases the probability of reaching higher levels of economic growth. In the sub-samples
we were not able to find statistical evidence that there is a difference in the distribution
of long-run growth between those in the bottom 33% of the redistribution effort each year,
and those in the middle. However, we found statistical evidence that there is a difference
in the same distribution between those in the middle and those in the top. Note that this
finding also suggests a difference between those in the bottom and those at the top, since
the distributions tend to move to the right as the redistribution level increases.
The main finding of this test indicates that there is a positive effect of redistribution on
economic growth, net of the effects controlled in the regression. This effect was verified in
all samples used, since in all of them we were able to find evidence of at least a positive
difference between those in the middle and those at the top up to 1% significance level.
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Table 3 - Regression Estimates (Full Sample)
Growthi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Redi,t−10 3.4653*** 2.8214*** 2.3491*** 2.4269***
(0.4348) (0.4489) (0.4776) (0.4604)
Schoolingi,t−10 0.0084*** 0.0063*** 0.0061*** 0.0050***
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
TradeOpennessi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
GDPPCi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
Geographyi 7 3 7 3 7 3
Y eart 7 3 7 3 7 3
Observations 1,597 1,384 1,445 1,404 1,425 1,384
R2 0.0461 0.5122 0.0518 0.5078 0.0678 0.5185
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find evidence that redistribution has a net positive effect on 10-year growth. Table
3 reveals evidence of statistical significance, even when controlled for the general growth
factors. A reduction in income inequality due to government action has a positive effect
on 10-year growth up to 1% significance level. This results can support the theory that
the negative effects of inequality have a higher impact than the positive ones, and thus,
government intervention that reduces income inequality is on average desirable. We also find
the same evidence as Barro and Lee, that an increase in the proportion of the population
that has a minimum level of schooling can increase growth in the long-run.
Another finding is that given that the variable redistribution does not lose statistical
significance when we introduce schooling in the regression shows that human capital may not
be the major channel through which inequality harms growth, and thus supports the findings
of those who pointed other vehicles, since the negative impact of inequality is still evident,
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and the difference between the coefficient of redistribution in (2) and (6) falls between the
confidence interval of the estimator. We also find that on average, government intervention
that reduced inequality measured by the Gini Index of 1 point (0.01), can result in an increase
of 2.43% of per capita GDP, in 10-years time, or approximately 0.243% per year.
Table 4 - Regression Estimates (Advanced Economies)
Growthi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Redi,t−10 -0.2380 1.1669*** -0.3741 1.0199**
(0.6893) (0.4003) (0.7336) (0.4262)
Schoolingi,t−10 0.0020 0.0050 0.0026 0.0036
(0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0032)
TradeOpennessi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
GDPPCi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
Geographyi 7 3 7 3 7 3
Y eart 7 3 7 3 7 3
Observations 551 542 551 542 551 542
R2 0.0002 0.7011 0.0005 0.6993 0.0009 0.7022
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 - Regression Estimates (Developing Economies)
Growthi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Redi,t−10 4.9334*** 5.2978*** 5.5222*** 4.8690***
(0.7971) (0.9140) (0.9341) (0.9286)
Schoolingi,t−10 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0061*** 0.0051***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0014)
TradeOpennessi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
GDPPCi,t−10 7 3 7 3 7 3
Geographyi 7 3 7 3 7 3
Y eart 7 3 7 3 7 3
Observations 1,046 842 894 862 874 842
R2 0.0393 0.4311 0.0346 0.4131 0.0772 0.4387
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results obtained on the advanced economies (Table 4) show a reduction on the
magnitude of redistribution over economic growth, and the results remain significant up to
5% significance level. On average, government intervention that reduces inequality measured
by the Gini Index of 0.01, can result in an increase of 1.02% of per capita GDP, in 10-years
time, which yields an increase of 0.10% per year. This suggests that the importance of
government intervention on wealth distribution is higher on developing economies, as the
impact on economic growth is expected to be almost twice higher when these are included
in the sample. We also do not find evidence that redistribution affects growth via schooling
since the redistribution coefficient of (6) also falls between the confidence interval for the
estimator in (2).
Table 5 presents the regression for the developing economies. As expected, given the
previous results, the impact of redistribution on growth is higher in this sample. We expect
19
that a 0.01 reduction on the Gini Index due to government intervention yields an increase on
the 10-year GDP per capita growth of 4.87%, or approximately 0.49% a year. We do not find
evidence that schooling captures the effect of redistribution, given that the redistribution
coefficient remains significant up to 1% significance level, and the change in the coefficient
is much lower than one standard deviation of the estimator.
We also find evidence that the impact of redistribution on growth has higher magnitude on
developing economies than in advanced economies. This effect can be useful for policymakers
since the magnitude of the effect on the developing sample is higher, it is possible to infer
that reducing inequality can help these countries to catch up with those who are considered
advanced, given that the level up to which redistribution is a mechanism to trigger growth
appears to be more effective on the developing nations.
4 Discussion
Our results support one out of two hypotheses tested. First we found that government
intervention that redistributes wealth more equitably is expected to generate growth in the
long run. We found support for this claim in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed, since
we found statistical evidence of differences in the long-run growth distribution conditional
on the level of redistribution effort made by the government. In all samples the idea that
the countries whose government make higher effort to reduce the level of inequality are the
ones which can expect higher levels of growth in the next ten years. However, when we were
not able to find statistical evidence of a difference between the distribution of those in the
bottom 33% of the redistribution level, and those in the middle. It appears that there is a
threshold from to which the impact on growth becomes evident. This finding indicates that
redistribution may not have a linear impact on growth, and other specifications of the model
can be used for further studies which intend to capture a better picture of the marginal
impact of redistribution on growth.
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The regressions show that redistribution has an overall positive effect on growth. All
coefficients present statistical significance up to 5% confidence level, and up to 1% in the
full sample and in the sample of developing economies. This emphasizes that even though
redistribution may have a marginal cost of implementation, the negative effect inequality
has on growth justifies the intervention of policymakers in order to smooth it. However we
did not find evidence that part of the positive effect of government intervention is captured
by the human capital vehicle, as we did not obtain a statistically significant change on
the marginal impact of redistribution when controlling for the proportion of individuals who
attained a minimum level of schooling. These finds strengthen the findings of the authors who
pointed other vehicles for the negative impact of inequality such as increasing macroeconomic
volatility, as the effect of reducing inequality on growth is statistically significant in all the
samples.
This study is subject to a common problem in econometrics, which is that not all the right
hand side of the regression is fulfilled. Battisti et al. (2014) present eight control variables
that are used in many growth regressions. Although due to lack of available free data, we
were only able to use three of them. We leave aside the following variables:
• (1) The share of land in a country that is tropical
• (2) The share of land in a country that is within 100 km from a coast or from a
navigable river
• (3) The level of ethnic fractionalization
• (4) The quality of institutions
• (5) The share of public expenditures in GDP
The first two intend to capture growth that can arise from the exploitation of maritime
and alluvial resources, and from the use of sea and rivers as means of transportation. We
do not believe that there is a high level of correlation with the redistribution proxy used,
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nor with schooling, such that it can cause our estimators to be biased. The level of ethnic
fractionalization can influence the political process, and thus the redistribution effort, thus
it can be a flaw of our study, and we suggest its incorporation if the data is available.
The quality of institutions is also a determinant not only of the redistribution level, but
also of its effectiveness, and thus we consider it its absence in our regression as the major
flaw of this study. As for the share of public expenditures in GDP, we believe that the
redistribution proxy can partially mimic its behavior, since they are directly linked, as part
of the redistribution effort made by the government is made through subsidies, which account
as public expenditure. The variable schooling also reflects some part of public expenditure
in education, at least on the countries where public schooling represents a significant share
of the supply of education. Therefore, we believe that the absence may not be very harmful
for the significance of our results, its inclusion would most likely be partially replicating the
effect of the variables we are studying. The final limitations we identify are up to what
extent do our variables represent the impacts we aim to study. The redistribution effort we
computed is measured in units of Gini index, which can make the use of our findings for
policy purposes complicated. How much does the government need to redistribute in order
to reduce 0.01 points in the Gini index, might not be easily computed.
The variable schooling intended to capture the impact of human capital on growth. How-
ever, human capital is hard to measure, and even though education can capture a significant
part, human capital also includes the potential for technological innovation, according to the
world bank, and this potential is nearly impossible to measure quantitatively.
Given the limitations identified, we still believe that due to the high level of statistical




This study started by presenting the different views regarding the impact of income inequality
on economic growth. In the literature we found arguments that support that some level
of inequality might be desirable and can sustain economic growth, at least in the short-
run. However, most recent studies point out three main vehicles through which inequality
jeopardizes growth. The first argument is that more unequal countries tend to redistribute
more, and thus incur in a cost while redistributing their wealth. This raised the first question
of our study. If inequality is bad for growth, does the benefit of reducing it compensates
for the marginal cost of redistribution? The second argument is that inequality can deprive
individuals from investing in human capital. We then test this argument by verifying up to
what extent does the level of schooling captures the effect of redistribution on growth. The
last argument we found was that inequality can increase macroeconomic volatility, but we
leave this vehicle out of the scope of this study.
Our data sets are the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and the
Barro and Lee dataset. The SWIID provides data on the net and gross Gini index of 174
countries. The Barro and Lee dataset provided the proportion of over 15 age individuals
who attain a minimum level of schooling, and the regions used as control variables. Data
on each country’s exports and imports was downloaded from the World Bank. Our final
dataset includes data from 1960 to 2008
We perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to verify if countries who make higher redistri-
bution efforts have different distributions of long-run growth, net of the effects of the control
variables. We found that there is at least a positive difference between the 33% who redis-
tribute less and the 33% who redistribute more in all the samples. We use a full sample, a
sample of advanced economies and one of developing.
Finally we run a growth regression in these samples to test for a positive marginal impact
of redistribution, and if the schooling vehicle captures some of that impact. Our results sup-
port that the negative effects of inequality compensates the marginal cost of redistribution.
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We found that redistribution has a net positive effect on growth in all samples. We found
evidence that this impact is higher in developing economies than in advanced economies.
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6 Appendix
List of countries used in the sample:
Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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